经济学人：
Is china about to unleash another wave of deindustrialisation on the rich world? About 1m American manufacturing workers lost their jobs to Chinese competition in 1997-2011, as the country integrated into the global trading system and began shipping cheap goods overseas. This “China shock” has since been blamed for everything from rising deaths among working-class Americans to the election of Donald Trump. The rejection of liberal attitudes to trade also explains why politicians embrace industrial policy today. Now China’s carmakers are enjoying an astonishing rise. That stokes fears of another ruinous shock. In fact, the successes of Chinese cars should be celebrated, not feared.
中国是否即将向富裕国家掀起另一波去工业化浪潮？ 1997年至2011年，随着中国融入全球贸易体系并开始向海外运送廉价商品，大约有100万美国制造业工人在中国的竞争中失去了工作。此后，从美国工人阶级死亡人数上升到唐纳德·特朗普当选，这种“中国冲击”被归咎于一切。对贸易自由态度的拒绝也解释了为什么政治家们今天拥护产业政策。现在中国的汽车制造商正在享受惊人的崛起。这引发了人们对另一场毁灭性冲击的担忧。事实上，中国汽车的成功应该值得庆祝，而不是恐惧。
Just five years ago China shipped only a quarter as many cars as Japan, then the world’s biggest exporter. This week the Chinese industry claimed to have exported over 5m cars in 2023, exceeding the Japanese total. China’s biggest carmaker, byd, sold 0.5m electric vehicles (evs) in the fourth quarter, leaving Tesla in the dust. Chinese evs are so snazzy, whizzy and—most important—cheap that the constraint on their export today is the scarcity of vessels for shipping them. As the world decarbonises, demand will rise further. By 2030 China could double its share of the global market, to a third, ending the dominance of the West’s national champions, especially in Europe.
就在五年前，中国的汽车出货量仅为当时全球最大出口国日本的四分之一。本周，中国汽车工业声称 2023 年汽车出口量将超过 500 万辆，超过日本总量。中国最大的汽车制造商比亚迪第四季度销售了 50 万辆电动汽车 (EV)，将特斯拉远远甩在身后。中国的电动汽车如此时髦、新颖，而且最重要的是价格低廉，以至于目前其出口的限制因素是运输它们的船只的稀缺。随着世界脱碳，需求将进一步上升。到 2030 年，中国在全球市场的份额可能会增加一倍，达到三分之一，从而结束西方国家冠军的主导地位，尤其是在欧洲。
This time it will be even easier for politicians to pin the blame for any Western job losses on Chinese foul play. A frosty geopolitical climate will feed the sentiment that subsidised production unfairly puts Western workers on the scrapheap. And there have certainly been subsidies. Since the launch of its “Made in China” agenda in 2014, China has brazenly disregarded global trading rules, showering handouts on its carmakers. It is hard to be precise about the value of the underpriced loans, equity injections, purchase subsidies and government contracts Chinese firms enjoy. But by one estimate, total public spending on the industry was in the region of a third of ev sales at the end of the 2010s. These subsidies come on top of the ransacking of technology from joint ventures with Western carmakers and Western and South Korean battery-makers.
这一次，政客们将更容易将西方国家失业的原因归咎于中国的不法行为。寒冷的地缘政治气候将助长这样一种情绪：生产补贴不公平地将西方工人置于废品堆中。当然也有补贴。自2014年启动“中国制造”议程以来，中国公然无视全球贸易规则，向其汽车制造商大量施舍。中国企业享受的低价贷款、股权注入、采购补贴和政府合同的价值很难准确计算。但据估计，到 2010 年代末，该行业的公共总支出约占电动汽车销量的三分之一。这些补贴是在从与西方汽车制造商以及西方和韩国电池制造商的合资企业中掠夺技术的基础上进行的。
The temptation will therefore be for rich-world policymakers to shield their carmakers from the onslaught of state-backed competition. In October the European Commission opened an investigation into Chinese cars. President Joe Biden is said to be considering increasing tariffs on them, even though America’s carmakers, protected by a 27.5% levy and handouts from the Inflation Reduction Act, currently face little Chinese competition. Yet locking out Chinese cars would be a mistake. The potential gains to the West from a ready supply of cheap, green vehicles are simply enormous—and dwarf the cost of disruption and the dangers it brings.
因此，富裕国家的政策制定者将面临保护本国汽车制造商免受国家支持的竞争冲击的诱惑。十月，欧盟委员会对中国汽车展开调查。据称，乔·拜登总统正在考虑提高这些汽车的关税，尽管美国汽车制造商受到 27.5% 的关税和《通货膨胀削减法案》的保护，目前几乎没有面临中国的竞争。然而，将中国汽车拒之门外将是一个错误。廉价、绿色汽车的现成供应给西方带来的潜在收益是巨大的，而且使破坏的成本及其带来的危险相形见绌。
One reason is that the market for cars is going to be upended, regardless of trade with China. In 2022, 16-18% of new cars sold around the world were electric; in 2035 the eu will ban the sale of new cars with internal-combustion engines. Though firms are retaining their workers as they switch to making evs, the process is less labour-intensive. Much as the first China shock was responsible for less than a fifth of total manufacturing job losses occurring at the time—many of which were attributable to welcome technological advances—so too there is a danger of confusing disruption caused by the shift to evs with that caused by Chinese production of them.
原因之一是，无论与中国的贸易如何，汽车市场都将被颠覆。 2022年，全球销售的新车中16-18%是电动汽车； 2035年，欧盟将禁止销售内燃机新车。尽管公司在转向制造电动汽车时保留了工人，但这个过程的劳动密集度较低。正如第一次中国冲击导致当时制造业失业总数不到五分之一（其中许多归因于受欢迎的技术进步）一样，也存在将电动汽车转向所造成的破坏与电动汽车混淆的危险。由中国生产造成的。
Next consider the gains from letting trade flow. Vehicles are among people’s biggest purchases, accounting for about 7% of American consumption. Cheaper cars mean more money to spend on other things, at a time when real wages have been squeezed by inflation. And Chinese cars are not only cheap; they are better-quality, particularly with respect to the smart features in evs that are made possible by internet connectivity. Nor does the existence of a carmaking industry determine a country’s economic growth. Denmark has among the world’s highest living standards without a carmaker to speak of. Even as cars roll off Chinese assembly lines, the economy is spluttering—in part because it has been so distorted by subsidies and state control.
接下来考虑让贸易流动的收益。汽车是人们最大的购买行为之一，约占美国消费的 7%。在实际工资受到通货膨胀挤压的情况下，更便宜的汽车意味着有更多的钱可以花在其他事情上。中国汽车不仅价格便宜，而且价格低廉。它们的质量更高，特别是在电动汽车中通过互联网连接实现的智能功能方面。汽车制造业的存在也不能决定一个国家的经济增长。丹麦是世界上生活水平最高的国家之一，但没有汽车制造商可言。即使汽车从中国的装配线上下线，中国的经济仍陷入困境——部分原因是补贴和国家控制严重扭曲了经济。
Last, consider the benefits to the environment. Politicians around the world are realising just what a tall order it is to ask consumers to go green, as a backlash against costly emissions-reductions policies builds. evs, too, are currently more expensive than gas-guzzling cars (even if their running costs are lower). Embracing Chinese cars with lower prices could therefore ease the transition to net-zero emissions. The cheapest ev sold in China by byd costs around $12,000, compared with $39,000 for the cheapest Tesla in America.
最后，考虑对环境的好处。随着对代价高昂的减排政策的强烈抵制，世界各地的政客们都意识到，要求消费者走向绿色环保是多么艰巨的任务。目前，电动汽车也比耗油量高的汽车更贵（即使它们的运行成本较低）。因此，采用价格较低的中国汽车可以缓解向净零排放的过渡。比亚迪在中国销售的最便宜的电动汽车售价约为 12,000 美元，而美国最便宜的特斯拉售价为 39,000 美元。
What about the risks? The threat to industry from cheap imports is usually overblown. The lesson from the rise of Japanese and South Korean carmakers in the 1980s is that competition spurs local firms to shift up a gear, while the entrants eventually move production closer to consumers. Already, byd is opening a factory in Hungary and many Chinese carmakers are scouting for sites in North America. Meanwhile the likes of Ford and Volkswagen are racing to catch Chinese firms. Last year Toyota said a breakthrough in its “solid state” technology would let it slash the weight and cost of its batteries.
那么风险呢？廉价进口产品对工业的威胁通常被夸大了。 20 世纪 80 年代日本和韩国汽车制造商崛起的教训是，竞争促使本土企业加速发展，而进入者最终将生产基地移至离消费者更近的地方。比亚迪已经在匈牙利开设了一家工厂，许多中国汽车制造商也在北美寻找工厂。与此同时，福特和大众等公司正在竞相追赶中国企业。去年，丰田表示，其“固态”技术的突破将使其能够减轻电池的重量和成本。
Another worry is national security. Depending entirely on China for batteries, whose importance to electrified economies will go far beyond cars, would be risky. It is also possible that evs, which are filled with chips, sensors and cameras could be used for surveillance. (China has banned even locally made Teslas from some government properties.) But so long as presidents and spooks can travel in vehicles made in the West or by its allies, there is little reason to fear consumers sporting Chinese wheels; they can adjudicate personal-privacy concerns themselves and locally made cars will be easier to inspect.
另一个担忧是国家安全。电池对电气化经济的重要性将远远超出汽车，完全依赖中国的电池是有风险的。充满芯片、传感器和摄像头的电动汽车也有可能用于监控。 （中国甚至禁止在一些政府财产中使用本地制造的特斯拉。）但只要总统和间谍可以乘坐西方或其盟友制造的汽车出行，就没有理由担心消费者使用中国车轮；他们可以自行裁决个人隐私问题，并且本地制造的汽车将更容易检查。
Policymakers should therefore curb their protectionist instincts and worry only in the unlikely event that Western carmakers implode altogether. A hefty market share for Chinese carmakers that invigorates wider competition, however, is not to be feared. If China wants to spend taxpayers’ money subsidising global consumers and speeding up the energy transition, the best response is to welcome it. ■
因此，政策制定者应该抑制自己的保护主义本能，只在西方汽车制造商全面崩溃的情况下才担心。然而，中国汽车制造商的巨大市场份额激发了更广泛的竞争，这一点并不值得担心。如果中国想用纳税人的钱补贴全球消费者、加速能源转型，最好的回应就是欢迎。
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